Abstract TenyearshaveelapsedsincethefirstTobaccoAdvertisingjudgment,inwhichtheCourtfor the first time concluded that the EU legislature had stepped beyond the limits of its competence to harmonize national laws which is granted by the Treaty. However, those subsequently seeking annulment of measures of harmonization have almost all been disappointed. This paper surveys the accumulated case law and finds that the
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A.Introduction
Ten years have elapsed since the first Tobacco Advertising judgment -more properly, Germany v. Parliament and Council 1 , in which the Court of Justice for the first time concludedthattheEuropeanUnion(EU)legislaturehadsteppedbeyondthelimitsofthe competencetoharmonizenationallawswhichisgrantedbytheTreaty.Thatmomentous decision was heralded as an important assertion of the Court's constitutional role in controlling political infidelity to the principle that the EU's scope for action is limited to that mandated by the founding Treaties, which are now the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). However, those subsequentlyseekingannulmentofmeasuresoflegislativeharmonizationbeforetheCourt have almost all been disappointed. How now, ten years later, should we assess the first Tobacco Advertising case? This paper begins with a summary of the groundbreaking Tobacco Advertising ruling (B) before expressing doubt that the "limits" of EU legislative competenceinthenameofharmonizationarereliable(C),andreinforcesthatskepticism withanalysisofthemorerecentcaselawoftheCourt(D).ThepaperfindsthattheTreaty rulesgoverningEUcompetence-bothitsdefinitionandtheprinciplesofproportionality andsubsidiaritythatgovernitsexercise-areill-suitedinpracticetogiverealmeaningto theprinciplethattheEUhasonlylimitedcompetencegrantedbyitsTreaty(E).Thepattern is circular: the Court presents a formula which defines the proper scope of legislative harmonizationandwhichsetsoutthecontrolexercisedbytheprinciplesofproportionality andsubsidiarity,theEUlegislaturedulyadoptstheapprovedbutreliablyvaguevocabulary and,providedthedraftingiswell-chosen,theCourthasnoplausiblebasisonwhichtoset aside the legislative act. Case law dealing with the limits of EU competence has been convertedintonomorethana"draftingguide"fortheEUlegislature.Thepaperaddsthat muchoftheenergywhichhaspropelledthespreadofEUharmonizationisattributableto theslipperycharacteroftheTreatyitself,andinthissensetherearereasonsdeeperthan mere institutional opportunism to explain why the Court has typically sided with the EU legislature.Thepaperthenshowshowmanyofthesedeficiencieshavebeenmaintained uncriticallyintherelevantTreatytextsafterthereformsmadebytheLisbonTreaty,even thoughamajorpartofthereformagendainitiatedbytheLaekenDeclarationwasinspired by "competence sensitivity." Lisbon has instead put most of its reforming faith in a new recruit to competence monitoring -the national parliaments of the Member States (F). Finding these adjustments poorly shaped at the level of detail, the paper nevertheless offersalargelypositiveassessmentoftheintentionbehindthesenewarrangements(G).In conclusion(H)thepaperfindsthattenyearsafterTobaccoAdvertisingtheCourt'scaselaw hasbecomelittlemorethana"draftingguide"foralegislaturewhichfindsitalltooeasyto assertcompliancewithArticle5TreatyonEuropeanUnion's(TEU)principlesofconferral, subsidiarity and proportionality in a manner which is unreviewable in practice. Beyond judicial control, the need for fresher political sensitivity to the perils of over-hasty centralizationisclear-anditisonethatafflictsallfederalandquasi-federalarrangements. G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l functioningoftheinternalmarketasdefinedinArticle26TFEU.So,astheCourthasputit, this means that the Treaty does not authorize a measure which has only the incidental effectofharmonizingmarketconditionswithintheUnion. 4 Putanotherway,theEUmay intervenetocurediversitybetweennationallawsonlywherethatdiversityisshowntobe harmful to the achievement of the EU's internal market. This is why Directive 98/34 on tobaccoadvertising,whichdidnotcrossthatthreshold,wasannulled. Though the Tobacco Advertising judgment was in principle not novel, it was the first instance of annulment of this type of EU legislation on these grounds. In part this was because until the entry into force of the Single European Act in 1987 harmonization legislation was adopted by unanimity in Council or not all, with the result that constitutionallydubiousadventurismwastypicallyshieldedfromconstitutionalreviewby theassemblyofpoliticalconsensus.
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TheriseofqualifiedmajorityvotinginCouncilopened upthepossibilityofMemberStatesrespondingtopoliticaldefeatinCouncilbyseekingto persuade the Court that the disputed legislation did not fall within the EU's Treaty mandate.ThisispreciselythepatternofGermany'ssuccessfulapplicationtotheCourtin the case. So the ruling is of landmark significance as an expression of judicial defense of thelimitsofEUlegislativecompetenceagainstpoliticalpreferencetoslipfreeofthelimits agreedandapprovedbynationalconstitutionalprocessatthetimetheTreatywasdrafted and subsequently revised. The Court's reading of the Treaty, not a qualified majority in CouncilalliedwithParliamentarysupport,decideswhattheEUmayandmaynotdo. SoTobaccoAdvertisingapplieswhatweknowtodayasthe"principleofconferral"tothe particular case of legislative harmonization. Article 5(2) TEU states that: "Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein"andadds(superfluously)that"CompetencesnotconferredupontheUnioninthe Treaties remain with the Member States." In precisely this vein the Court in Tobacco Advertisinghadrefusedtotreatlegislativeharmonizationascreating"ageneralpowerto regulatetheinternalmarket"becausethiswouldbeincompatiblewiththeprinciplethat "thepowersoftheCommunity [nowUnion] arelimitedtothosespecificallyconferredon it." 6 4 E.g. CaseC-155/91,Commissionv.Council,1993E.C.R.I-939; CaseC-209/97,Commissionv.Council,1999E .C.R.
I-8067. in particular where there are differences between national rules which are such as to obstruct the G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l fundamental freedoms and thus have a direct effect on the functioning of the internal market....Recoursetothatprovisionisalsopossibleiftheaimistopreventtheemergence of such obstacles to trade resulting from the divergent development of national laws. However, the emergence of such obstacles must be likely and the measure in question mustbedesignedtopreventthem...." 8 The point -made explicitly in the first Tobacco Advertising case itself 9 -is that effective judicialmonitoringofthelimitsdictatedbytheTreatywouldbeimpossiblewereamere finding of disparities between national rules or of the abstract risk of obstacles to the exercise of fundamental freedoms or of distortions of competition enough to justify relianceonArticle114TFEU.TheCourtinsistsondefiningandpolicingathresholdforfear that without one the powers of the EU legislature "would be practically unlimited."
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In similarveintheCourtchosetoavoidjudgingthechallengedmeasurewithreferencetoits legislative history. The measure had been re-drafted on more than one occasion by the Commission to assert more strongly an internal market aim and to downplay the public health dimension which, one may readily suspect, was the driving motivation. This backgroundwassomethingofwhichtheCourtwasmadefullyawareinthehearings.
11 But it is certainly important that the Court chose not to place any reliance on the subjective viewsofthepoliticalinstitutionsindraftingandultimatelyadoptingthemeasure.Instead it preferred its own objectively presented inquiry into the contribution made by the Directivetothefunctioningoftheinternalmarket. Ononelevelthisseemstopromiseaconstitutionallyproperstandardofreview.Itseems to wrest from the political institutions and into judicial hands the ultimate source of authoritativerulingonthelawfulscopeoftheTreatymandate.This,however,isdeceptive. The Court places enormous weight on slippery adjectives and adverbs in its attempt to definethelimitsofArticle114TFEUinamoresophisticatedmannerthandoestheTreaty. The object of a measure must genuinely be to improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market. Conversely an abstract risk of infringements of fundamental freedoms or distortion of competition is not sufficient to justify reliance on Article 114 TFEU; differences must have a direct effect on the functioning of the internal market or cause an appreciable distortion of competition. Preventiveharmonization-targetedatobstaclestotraderesultingfromfuturedivergent developmentofnationallaw-isallowedbutemergenceofsuchobstaclesmustbelikely.
8 CaseC-58/08,Vodafone,O2etalv.SecretaryofState,judgmentof8June2010,paras.32-33. 9 SeeespeciallyGermanyv.ParliamentandCouncil,supra,note1,atparas.84&106.
10 Germanyv.ParliamentandCouncil,supra,note1,atpara.107.
11 AnditisconsideredintheopinionofA.G.Fennelly, Germanyv.ParliamentandCouncil, supra, note1, [74] [75] [76] [77] and168(1)TFEUtopublichealthandconsumerprotectionconcerns,theCourtconcluded that a harmonized rule "may consist in requiring all the Member States to authorize the marketing of the product or products concerned, subjecting such an obligation of authorization to certain conditions, or even provisionally or definitively prohibiting the marketing of a product or products."
14
There is plainly no objection in principle to a harmonizedbanongoods-providedthatthegenerallyapplicablecriteriaforrelianceon Article 114 are met, which will typically mean that the ban must form part of a regime dealingwithawidercategoryofproductsthansimplythosesubjectedtotheharmonized ban.SoalthoughtheTreatyislitteredwithsector-specificbasesforlegislationwhichare commonly drafted with circumspection, Article 114's functionally broad mandate for legislativeharmonizationgoesalongwaytosetasidesuchcautioninlegislativepractice. There is no circumvention of Article 168 (5) CaseC-210/03,SwedishMatch,2004E.C.R.I-11893,atpara.34; CasesC-154/04&C-155/04,supra,note13,at para.33; CaseC-380/03,Germanyv.ParliamentandCouncil,2006E.C.R.I-11573,atpara.43. [ Vol.12No.03 834 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l confinestheEUto"measureswhichsupport,supplementandmonitor"nationalconsumer lawbutharmonizationofconsumerlawpursuanttoArticle114readilyproceedsinsofar as divergences between national laws obstruct the functioning of the internal market. The Court embarks on an objective review of the impact of regulatory diversity in the internal market but the subjective political preferences and declared intentions of the MemberStatesintimatelyaffectthatassessment.Still,thereweresignificantargumentsto the effect that the size required under the Directive for the health warning labels precludedatraderlabelingeffectivelyincompliancewiththe(multilingual)rulesofmore than a small number of Member States. This practical objection to the plausibility of the claim that this measure not only aimed to protect public health but also truly served to improve the functioning of the internal market was pressed on the Court, but simply ignoredinitsjudgment.
19 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l SoDirective2001/37 wouldfitthismodelweresnusbannedasoneelementinaregulatoryschemecoveringa broaderrangeofpermittedtobaccoproducts.Theproblemisthatthereisnoexplanation of the existence of any such wider scheme in either the Directive or in the Court's judgment. This seems to be a free-standing ban on snus -and to permit such a freestanding ban seems to contradict the Court's refusal to accept the suppression of advertisingonashtraysandparasolsinthefirstTobaccoAdvertisingcase. 838 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l (inproceedingsinitiatedbyCanadaagainsttheEC), 30 notwithintheEU.AsamatterofEU law the problem for the challenger is that this measure, although shutting down a large partofthemarketforsealproducts,seemsonceagaintofitthelogicofArticle114.One bansunsafeproductsaspartofaschemetosecurefreemovementofsafeproducts:one bans seal products that are not the product of (in short) a traditional hunt in order to secure free movement of seal products which are so sourced. There is nothing in the wordingofArticle114norintheCourt'selaborationofitspre-conditionswhichexcludes suchanapproach.Doubtlessthe"decisivefactor"inselectingthecontrolexercisedbythe Regulation was animal welfare combined with preservation of the "culture" of the Inuit hunt,butthisisnoconstitutionalobjectiontouseofArticle114,providedthatanelement ofmarket-makingbeachieved.Toclosedownalargepartofthemarket(forsealproducts) toreleaseonlyasmallpartofitmightbethoughttoconstituteadisproportionateexercise ofthelegislativecompetenceconferredbyArticle114,but,aselaboratedbelowinSection E.I,onewouldhavelittleexpectationofsuccessinpersuadingtheCourttointerveneinthe name of proportionality once competence to legislate in the first place is successfully established.
IV.Directive2002/46:AllianceforNaturalHealthvSecretaryofStateforHealth InAllianceforNaturalHealthDirective2002/46onfoodsupplementswasheldvalid.
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The Directive, another Article 95 measure, harmonizes national rules governing foods containing concentrated sources of nutrients on the basis that legislative diversity at nationallevelharmsthefunctioningoftheinternalmarket.OnceagaintheCourtreliedon theDirective'sRecitalsandtheobservationsoftheParliamentandtheCouncilinfinding that the claim to disruptive legislative diversity was made good. It also referred to "a substantial number of complaints from economic operators" made to the Commission about such variation, 32 though it does not appear to have looked at any of these. And, withoutmore,relianceonArticle95EC,nowArticle114TFEU,isaccepted. As was already observed in connection with ex parte BAT, the Court's purportedly objectivereviewoftheimpactofregulatorydiversityintheinternalmarketisimmediately andunavoidablytiedtowhatMemberStatesdoandarelikelytodoandishereshownto be connected to apparently unverified private complaints. The competence conferred by Article 114 TFEU is not static, but rather dynamic, depending on regulatory practices, actual and likely, at national level and the reported impact on economic operators. The easy manipulation of these threshold criteria by those politically responsible for their 30 DS400,http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds400_e.htm. Thetestis that the measure must actually be intended to improve the conditions for the establishmentandfunctioningoftheinternalmarket.Probablyitislogicalthatthepurely internalsituationisrareandbecomingrarerinanincreasinglyintegratedEU-widemarket and that therefore an EU measure cannot sensibly be targeted at issues affecting only cross-border trade, for that category is not static. In any event the virtue of certainty of applicationmilitatesinfavorofanEUmeasurewhichexertsanimpactinsomeinstances on situations internal to a Member State, rather than basing its reach on an unclear and shifting "inter-State" criterion. But the consequent dynamic in favor of an EU regulatory competencethatisinprinciplelimitedbutinpracticetrulybroadisevident.Expansionism 33 The legislative impulse to go further (and to address e.g. ashtrays) was not abandoned but recycled in nonbindingform:seeCouncilRecommendationonthepreventionofsmokingandoninitiativestoimprovetobacco control,O.J.2003L22/31,basedonArticle152(4)EC. The Court found it found to be validly adopted under Article 95 EC, for there is variation between national practices, likely to grow more serious over time. Ireland's unsuccessful applicationwaslargelymotivatedbyaconcerntoshowthatthe"thirdpillar"shouldhave been used for a measure which it argued was primarily a measure to fight crime -this dimensionofthecaseisnowovertakenbythereformsmadebytheTreatyofLisbon. 842 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l toaddresstheproblemofthehighlevelofretailchargesforEU-wideroamingservices.So thiswastreatedasclassicpreventiveharmonizationaimedatimprovingtheconditionsfor thefunctioningoftheinternalmarket.InsimilarlyevasiveveintheCourtdidnotaddress the argument that national measures capping the cost of roaming were unlikely to be adoptedbecausetheywouldhavetheperverseeffectofharmingthecompetitiveposition of companies based on the regulator's territory while protecting only out-of-state consumers.
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The conditions for resort to Article 114 TFEU are not met where diverse nationalmeasuresareunlikelybecausenoproblemrequiringregulatoryinterventioncan be identified; probably they are met where a problem requiring regulatory attention is identifiedbutnationalmeasuresareunlikelybecauseofwantofincentivestoactand/or lack of aptitude to tackle the problem.
44
In such circumstances there is, in short, a deficiencyintheinternalmarketforeseenbyArticle26TFEUwhichtheEUlegislaturemay remedy. The point is, however, novel, and such exploration of the limits of Article 114 would have been intriguing. Regrettably this twist was completely ignored in a judgment whichtakesatfacevaluetheclaimsoftheEUlegislature. The Court conspicuously reached its conclusions in Vodafone by reference only to the observations presented by the EU's own institutions and those found in the recitals attachedtothemeasure.Itdrewonboththeexplanatorymemorandumtotheproposal and the impact assessment to substantiate the finding that there was a likelihood of divergentdevelopmentofnationallaws.TherecitalstatedtherewaspressureforMember States to take measures to address the problem of the high level of retail charges for roamingservices,andtheCourtaddsthatthiswasmoreoverconfirmedbytheCommission atthehearing.
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ThisisyetanotherMandyRice-Daviesmoment:theCommission,having piloted the measure through the EU legislative process, then advises the Court it is constitutionallyjustified-well,itwould,wouldn'tit. 46 This broad legislative discretion extends also to some extent to the finding of basic facts. 50 Equally although the exercise of a competence that exists requires compliance with the principlesofproportionalityandsubsidiarity,theapplicationofbothprinciplesinvolvesthe grant of discretion to the legislative institutions. In ex parte BAT, for example, the Court insisted that the legislature "must be allowed a broad discretion in an area such as that involved in the present case, which entails political, economic and social choices on its part,andinwhichitiscalledupontoundertakecomplexassessments." 51 Inconsequencea measure must be manifestly inappropriate having regard to its objective before the legislative choice will be regarded as disproportionate and therefore invalid. Proportionalitymayhavebitewhereadministrativedecisionsaffectingtheindividualareat 47 For a sustained critique, taking EU tobacco regulation as its principal case study, see, ALEXANDER SOMEK,
INDIVIDUALISM:ANESSAYONTHEAUTHORITYOFTHEEUROPEANUNION(2008).
48 CaseC-210/03,supra,note20. 49 E.g.CaseC-66/04,supra,note36,atpara.45;CaseC-217/04,supra,note36,para.43;CaseC-380/03,supra, note34,atpara.42;CaseC-58/08,supra,note41,atpara.35. 50 CaseC-343/09,AftonChemicalLimitedv.SecretaryofStateforTransport,judgmentof8July2010,atpara.33. 51 CaseC-491/01,supra,note16,atpara.123. [Vol.12No.03 844 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l stakebutthebroaderthemeasure'sscope,thelesslikelythatproportionalitywilltripup the legislature.
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Only legislative choices that verge on the absurd are likely to be condemnedasmanifestlyinappropriate.Soacleanbillofhealthwasawardedinexparte BAT and in all the other cases mentioned above. In Alliance for Natural Health the applicantsattackedtheuseof"positivelists"-listsspecifyingexhaustivelywhichadditives may be used. It would be enough, they argued, to based the EU's nutrients régime on negativelists-stipulatinglessdictatoriallywhatmaynotbeincluded,ButfortheCourtthe authorsofDirective2002/46could"reasonablytaketheviewthatanappropriatewayof reconcilingtheobjectiveoftheinternalmarket,ontheonehand,withthatrelatingtothe protection of human health, on the other, was" to opt for a positive list. 53 Such perfunctoryreviewistypical. 54 Subsidiaritytoohasbeenallbutneuteredasabasisforjudicialintervention.ExparteBAT wasthefirstcaseinwhichtheCourtruledthatsubsidiarityevenappliestoArticle95:itdid so by finding that there is no exclusive competence at stake. But it then readily found compliance with the subsidiarity principle by observing that given that the Directive's objective wasto eliminate the barrierscausedbyinter-State regulatorydivergence while also ensuring a high level of health protection, it followed that since such an objective couldnotbesufficientlyachievedbytheMemberStatesindividuallybutratherwasbetter achieved at EU level, the dictates of subsidiarity were satisfied.
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This approach has becometheCourt'snorm 56 anditentailsthatwhenevertheEUsetscommonrulesthenby definitionithascompliedwiththeprincipleofsubsidiarity.Principle-thatthesearerules of constitutional significance which place reviewable limits on EU action -differs from practice. Accordinglyameasureofharmonizationhasneverbeenfoundtoviolatetheprincipleof proportionality or the principle of subsidiarity. The Court's interpretation of these principles governing the permitted exercise of Treaty-conferred legislative competence is immenselyrespectfuloflegislativediscretion. It is notorious that the legislature frequently inserts a Recital into measures asserting compliance with these principles without the slightest elaboration of why this is so. For 52 OnthedifferentcontextsinwhichproportionalityisappliedseeTAKISTRIDIMAS,THEGENERALPRINCIPLESOFEULAW Chapters3-5(2006 providesthat: "since the objective of this Regulation, namely the elimination of obstacles to the functioning of the internal market by harmonizing national bans concerning the trade in seal products at Community level, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore be better achieved at Community level, the Community may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulationdoesnotgobeyondwhatisnecessaryinordertoachievethatobjective." This is assertion rather than demonstration. As with the existence of legislative competence, so too its exercise: the legislature is evidently simply using the Court's case lawasadraftingguide.Suchmechanicalrecitationhasbecomecommonplace. 58 One could certainly encourage the Court to be more aggressive and to demand fuller elaboration of just why the legislature has concluded that the measure in question is compatible with the dictates of proportionality and subsidiarity. In 1997 it held that an "express reference" to subsidiarity was not a necessary pre-condition of a measure's validity.
59
That decision pre-dated the entry into force of the Protocol added by the AmsterdamTreaty,anditisprobablethatsince1999nosuchleniencywouldbeaccorded to acts that fail to include express recognition of the place of subsidiarity. The problem, however,ultimatelyliesinthenatureoftheprinciplesthemselves,notinlenientjudicial review.Subsidiarityispotentiallyhelpfulinsofarasitdirectsanengagementwithrelevant learning such as that exploring the economics of federalism as a basis for calculating the virtues and vices of centralized rule-making as opposed to local autonomy. 60 Nor should 57 Supra,note26. G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l suchsalientinquiryengageeconomicsalone:thereisevidentlyasensitiveandhistorically deep-rooted cultural context to the European debate about uniformity versus diversity. 61 Subsidiarity as antidote to blind pursuit of "more Europe" could serve a worthwhile purpose. But this is remote from legal rules of the type apt to form the basis of judicial review of legislation. None of the economic or cultural literature serves up cast-iron conclusionsonwhetherand,ifso,howtopursuecentralrules.Thereareinsteadmultiple relevant factors, varying in weight sector by sector, marking out a broad terrain within which political choices need to be made and priorities established. In this sense the principle of subsidiarity is to be understood as providing a framework within which to debate whether the EU should exercise a conferred competence and, if so (and in conjunctionwiththeprincipleofproportionality),thenhow.Theheartofsubsidiarity-ina broader sense than that in view in the confined context of judicial review -is an inquiry into whether even if the EU's objectives are advanced by and best achieved by the proposed measure, it is nevertheless important enough to override objections rooted in theworthofnationaldiversityandautonomy.
62
Thistypeofinquirycouldhardlybemore important in exploring what sort of "Europe" is being created but these are matters of political judgment. One might quarrel with legislative choices made about whether to pursueproblem-solvingcollectivelyatEUlevelorinsteadtotoleratethecostsofunsolved orinadequatelysolvedproblemswhileenjoyinggreaterscopeforlocaldiversity,butitis hard to see how such a decision could be treated as wrongin law.
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This does not make subsidiarity(orproportionality)uselessbutitdoespointtotheneedtomovebeyondthe Courtinfavorofawiderandmorevibrantinstitutionalcultureinwhichtheriskthatthe EUoperatesinamannerthatisstructurallybiasedinfavorofcentralizationisconfronted anditsimplicationsarecriticallydebated-especiallywheretherelevantlegalbasewhich imperils the operational utility of Article 5 TEU's principle of conferral is the functionally broad Article 114 TFEU. A heavier emphasis on procedural openness might usefully be demandedbytheCourt,sothatmeasuresmustexplainmorefullyjustwhatcalculations inform the conclusion that a conferred competence should be exercised in the manner selected -and one could at least expect the Court to invalidate acts that ignore the EuropeResearchPapersinLaw, http://www.coleurop.be/content/studyprogrammes/law/studyprog/pdf/ResearchPaper_1_2005_Pelkmans.pdf. Thatjobhasbeendone!Providedthe matter falls within the Treaty mandate conferred on the EU by the Member States, the legislative act is immune from judicial invalidation in the name of subsidiarity or proportionalityunlessthelegislaturehascommittedamanifesterror.
II.LegislativeDiscretioninPractice:ThePrincipleofConferral
By sharp contrast with the discretion admitted with regard to choice of method used to harmonize,itisamatterofconstitutionalprinciplethattheidentificationofacompetence to legislate in the first place is not in the gift of the legislature. Here there must be no discretion, but rather a firm constitutional defense of the limits on which Article 5 TEU's principleofconferralinsists.Defenseoftheprincipleofconferralingeneralandthelimits of legislative harmonization in particular is, as a matter of constitutional purity, foundationallyimportant.TheEU'sformallegitimacyisrootedinitsTreaties,whichwere duly authorized by approved constitutional procedures in all the Member States. That authorization was a limited grant of competence. The Court was doubtless correct to updateitsearlyobservationthat"…theMemberStateshavelimitedtheirsovereignrights, albeitwithinlimitedfields" 66 Case6/64,Costav.ENEL,1964E.C.R.585,Case26/62,VanGendenLoos,1963E.C.R.1. G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l constitutionallyinescapable.TheUnionmaynotextenditsowncompetences.Totrespass beyond the Treaty-defined limits is to destroy the foundations of the compact: it is certainly not for the EU legislature to adjust those limits for reasons of political convenience. Practicedoesnotcoincidewithprinciple.TheproblemisthattheTreatydeniestheCourt an operationally useful role in checking the limits of Article 114 TFEU. The problem is thereforethatthelegislatureinpracticeenjoysdiscretionheretoo.Itisabletoexploitthe broadandfuzzycontoursofArticle114TFEUtoconvertcompliancewiththeprincipleof conferralintolittlemorethanadraftingexercise.Infact,thetwogotogether:theCourt hasstriventoprovideamoreconcreteshapetothelimitsofArticle114TFEUthandoes the terms of the Treaty, but in doing so it has simply offered up an invitation to the legislaturetoenjoytheprotectionofitsslipstream.Thecaselawservesasadraftingguide. InthefirstTobaccoAdvertisingcase,examinedaboveinSection(B),theannulledDirective 98/43 purported to harmonize laws governing advertising or sponsorship of tobacco productsinordertoimprovethefunctioningoftheinternalmarketinproductsthatserve asmediaforsuchmessages.TheRecitalsclaimedaneedtocountercircumventionofthe rules by covering all forms and means of advertising (apart from television advertising whichwasalreadycoveredbyDirective89/552)but,beyondthis,itofferednoexplanation ofwhythematerialscopewassoextraordinarilybroad,banning"allformsofadvertising and sponsorship" in the EU, according to Article 3(1). It is in fact a very short legislative text, occupying just four pages of the Official Journal. So the Court fixed on "static" advertisingmediasuchasposters,cinemaadvertisingandadvertisingviaparasolsandashtrays,noneofwhichareexplicitlymentionedinthemeasureatall,andcommentedthat tradebetweenMemberStateswasnotfacilitatedbytheban 68 whichappearstobebased ontheGermansubmissionthattradeis"practicallynon-existentandhastodatenotbeen subjecttoanyrestrictions." Directive 2003/33 was naturally more carefully presented than its annulled predecessor: as explained, it was tied to the advertising of tobaccoproductsonamuchmorenarrowlydrawnrangeofmedia.Moreovertherecitals to Directive 2003/33 dutifully claim there is an "appreciable" risk of distortion of competition;"likely"increaseinfuturebarriersisasserted.Thelegislaturelearnstodraft measures with a good deal more care, relying heavily on the constitutionally approved vocabularywithwhichtheCourtsupplieditinthefirstTobaccoAdvertisingcaseandthose thathavefollowed.And-crucially-thereisminimalscopefortheCourttodomorethan acceptthattheconstitutionalboxeshavebeenticked. The question now is whether the first Tobacco Advertising case was really a constitutionally significant assertion of judicial policing of the limits of EU law or instead simplyaglimpseofamomentoflegislativelaziness.Allthatthelegislatureneededtohave done in the annulled Directive 98/43 was to assert the imminent emergence of diverse rulesgoverningadvertisingonashtraysandparasols(andsoon),perhapsaddingreference to Member State regulatory intentions and/ or concerns expressed by traders, and to connectthistoobstaclestofreemovementinsuchgoods.TheEUlegislatureknowsbetter now:thankstotheCourt'scaselaw,ithasitsdraftingguide.Legislativecompliancewith theprinciplesofsubsidiarityandproportionalityisreadilyachievedbyfaithfulrepetitionof the formulae approved by the Court: this is troubling, but reflects the intensely political character of the assessments involved which militate against intense judicial review. By contrast it is profoundly alarming that determining the limits of the EU's conferred competence pursuant to Article 114 TFEU is also in practice subject to a high degree of legislative discretion. The reality, surveyed supra, in Section D, is a proliferation of generousjudicialapprovalofwide-rangingregulatoryinterventionconductedbytheEUin the(inpractice)unverifiablenameofmarket-makingharmonization. F.Whatcanbedoneaboutthis?TheLisbonReforms ThedebatesaboutEUcompetenceconductedoverthepastdecadelargelyassumethata more effective review system is required. It is time to move beyond the orthodox assumption that the political institutions will take care of competence anxieties ex ante whiletheCourtwillstepinexpostfactoifneeded. [Vol.12No.03 850 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l legal/constitutional issue. Taking it seriously demands attention to both text and institutionalcontext.
The Lisbon Treaty has made some useful reforms. But they are badly judged in some respects: this is explained below. Moreover, the need for greater scrutiny has become more pressing as it has become still clearer even after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty that the Court's role is and will remain limited. In summary of the examination presentedaboveculminatinginthepost-LisbonrulinginVodafone, 75 theCourt'scaselaw doesnotdiscloseaneffectivebasisforpolicingthelimitsofEUcompetenceingeneraland thosepertainingtoArticle114TFEUinparticular.Thecaselawisadraftingguideforthe legislature: the Court is empowering, not restraining, the legislative institutions.
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And proportionality and subsidiarity too have become little more than labels which the legislature attaches to adopted measures in terms which simply mimic the Court's own constitutionalvocabulary. TheLisbonTreatyaimstoclarifymoreaggressivelythattheMemberStatesarethesource of the competences which are conferred on the Union. This is visible in Article 1(1) TEU. Moreover,theTreatybroadcaststhepointthatcompetencesnotconferredontheUnion restwiththeMemberStates.ThisisvisibleinArticles4(1)and5(2)TEU.Theseprovisions reflect a political desire to emphasize more powerfully the limited nature of the EU's powersandfunctions.Butthisisnovelrhetoric:thereisnochangeofsubstance.Similarly TitleITFEUonCategoriesandAreasofUnioncompetence(Articles2-6TFEU)isagooddeal more transparent in its portrayal of the scope, nature and effect of Union legislative competence than anything to be found in the profoundly messy pre-Lisbon Treaty texts. This may well help to improve the quality of the debate about the nature of the EU's competence.Butinsubstancelittlechanges.And,forpresentpurposes,itisimportantthat textualadjustmentsmadetowhatarenowArticles26and114TFEUandtotheprinciples ofproportionalityandsubsidiarityarecosmetic:noattempthasbeenmadetore-draftthe relevantprovisionsinawaythatbetterservestolimitEUaction. One must readily admit that the Lisbon reforms have a conservative taste. More radical proposed alterations were not accepted. 77 So, for example, the idea of a "hard list" EUROPÉEN 305 (2005 82 TheonlyadjustmentmadebytheLisbonTreatytothepatternofjudicialcontrolconcerns standing. Article 8 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality refers to the existing jurisdiction of the Court under Article 263 TFEU to checkalegislativeact'scompliancewiththeprincipleofsubsidiarity.Itthenaddsthatthe CommitteeoftheRegionsmaybringanactionagainstlegislativeactsfortheadoptionof G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l whichtheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnionprovidesthatitbeconsulted; and,ofpresentrelevance,thatapplicationsmaybebroughtbyMemberStatesor"notified by them in accordance with their legal order on behalf of their national Parliament or a chamberthereof."Thisispeculiar.Itseemsthatthisdoesnomorethanstatethecurrent position!PerhapstheintentistoconferanobligationonaMemberStatetopursuesuch anapplicationwhereitsnationalParliamentorachamberthereofsoresolves:butthisis certainlynottheinevitableinterpretationofthisobscurephrasing.Moreoverthisrouteis ofnopracticalvalueiftheCourtadherestoitscautiousapproachtojudicialreviewinthe nameofsubsidiarity(explainedsupra,inSectionE.I). ThedominantassumptionthroughouttheprocessofreviewinitiatedattheConventionon the Future of Europe and concluded in December 2009 on the entry into force of the LisbonTreatywasthattheCourt'sreviewfunctionshouldnotbeadjusted-thoughrarely wasitsactualcontenteverconsidered-butthatitneededtobesupplementedbyother political controls. In particular, a more questioning political culture was needed, and it shouldinfecttheexanteprocess. Inthisvein,forallitsconservativetendencies,theLisbonTreatyhasachievedinstitutional reform.ForthefirsttimenationalParliamentsareformallygrantedadirectinvolvementin the EU lawmaking process. Whereas hitherto the assumption was that their interests wouldbereflectedintheCounciland,inturn,thattheywouldholdtheirrepresentativesin Council to account, this model has been treated as inadequate. Executive power, rather thanParliamentarycontrol,hastoooftenbeentherealityofCouncilpractice.Thisisone reason why EU legislative competence has crept outwards. National Parliaments are the principal losers and giving them a voice is an attractive way to re-balance the EU lawmakingdebateinthedirectionofamorecriticaltone.Muchofthiswasacceptedatthe Convention on the Future of Europe. Its proposals were incorporated in the Treaty establishing a Constitution and then with some small adjustment transplanted to the TreatyofLisbon. AnewArticle12TEU,locatedinTitleIIonProvisionsonDemocraticPrinciples,dealswith theroleofnationalParliaments.Theyshall"contributeactivelytothegoodfunctioningof the Union." Competence control is part of this, and is of direct relevance to the current inquiry.
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The Protocol on the role of national Parliaments deals with the distribution to nationalParliamentsofinformationconcerninginteraliaplannedlegislativeinitiatives;the submission of a reasoned opinion in cases of suspected violation of the subsidiarity principle by a draft legislative act; an eight week (this is extended from the six week windowprovidedforintheTreatyestablishingaConstitution)standstillperioddesignedto give national Parliaments a real practical opportunity to intervene, applicable in all but urgentcases. 83 On this, and more generally, see Martin Gennart, Les Parlements Nationaux dans le Traité de Lisbonne: EvolutionouRévolution,46/1-2CAHIERSDEDROITEUROPEEN17(2010) .
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TheProtocolonsubsidiarityandproportionalityabsorbsthisprocedureinArticle6.Then inArticle7itputsfleshonthebones.Wherereasonedopinionsonnon-compliancewith subsidiarityrepresentatleastonethirdofallthevotesallocatedtonationalParliaments, the draft legislative act must be reviewed. This is the so-called yellow card. The Commission may then maintain, amend or withdraw the draft, giving reasons for this. Wherereasonedopinionsonnon-compliancewithsubsidiarityrepresentasimplemajority ofvotescastbynationalparliaments,thentheCommissionmustreviewtheproposaland, if it decides to maintain it, it must itself present a reasoned opinion setting out its view whytheproposalcomplieswiththesubsidiarityprinciple.Itis,then,notaredcard-aveto -butratherithascometobeknownasanorangecard.ItwasnotenvisagedbytheTreaty establishingaConstitution,sointhisrespecttheLisbonTreaty,bysteppingbeyondamere yellowcard,hasstrengthenedthecontrol.Theseopinionsarethenmadeavailabletothe Union legislator and shall be considered in the manner set out in Article 7(3) of the Protocol, which provides for consideration before the conclusion of the first reading of compliancewithsubsidiaritycoupledtospecialvotingrulesallowingCouncilorParliament to terminate the proposal. The procedure is applicable not only to subsidiarity concerns arising under any Treaty provision authorizing legislative action: it applies mutatis mutandis to any legislative proposal adopted under Article 352 TFEU, where objections neednotbeconfinedtoperceivedviolationofthesubsidiarityprinciple. Thereisnoredcardbutobjectionsonascalesufficienttobrandishayellowcardand,all the more so, an orange card will doubtless constitute real political pressure that will be damaging, if not necessarily fatal, to the proposed measure's vitality. It is moreover possiblethatuseofthenewexantemonitoringsystemwillprovidethebasisforaslightly more intensive ex post control by the Court: in particular one might envisage that if the objections of several national Parliaments were swept aside with contemptuously thin reasoning the Court might be inclined to find the measure invalid. The Court could plausibly effect a shift in presumption: the Commission would need to show something approaching a manifest error of appraisal in the objections before it could proceed with the proposal, on pain of annulment. 84 The threat of such ex post control might helpfully induce political actors at EU level to take seriously ex ante critical input by national Parliaments. ThebasicaimistomaximizetheopportunityfordialogueaboutEUlegislativepracticeand forthevoiceofthenationalParliamentstobeheardmoreeffectively.TheProtocolhasthe potential to serve as a framework which national Parliaments will need actively to completeinordertoensuretheproceduredoesnotbecomeadeadletter. G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l likelythattheprincipalroleofnationalParliamentswillremainthatofholdingexecutives to account in the context of national political debate -and it is probable that that is entirelyproperand,inparticular,sharpeningupscrutinyatEUlevelshouldbeinaddition to,andnotattheexpenseof,domesticcontrol. 86 G.Lisbon:ItcouldhavebeenBetter The Lisbon reforms are shaped according to an assumption that straining the EU's competence is damaging to its legitimacy: under-explained centralization aggravates mistrust. Their relatively conservative character also suggests an anxiety to avoid overhastyabandonmentofwhatusedtobeknownas"Communitymethod."Judgedaccording to the durability of the method of competence allocation and its ex ante and ex post applicationinordertoforestalltheslippageofauthorityfromconstituentelementstothe centre the EU's orthodox arrangements score badly when compared with (other) federal arrangements. 87 Thisisnotsosurprising.TheEUisrelativelyyoung,anditbeganlifewith nothing. The debate of the current decade can be viewed optimistically as a sign of maturity, within which a more balanced assessment may be made about the virtues and vicesofcentralizationandlocalautonomyinEurope.Itisalsotobereadasarejectionof moreaggressivedesiretoswingthewholedebateagainstthepossibilityofcentralization intheEU. The principal place for addressing the problems of "competence creep" must lie in the institutional culture of the EU, nourished by input from national political culture. In fact there is a mix of constitutionally distinct phenomena at stake in this debate about competence.Itcoversfixingthescopeoflegislativecompetence"proper"(whichisArticle 5(2)TEU);thedirectionsgivenbythesubsidiarityandproportionalityprinciplesonwhena legislative competence should be exercised (Articles 5(3) and 5(4) TFEU); and, more broadly, the exhortations to regulate "better," which embrace concern for clarity, simplification,and soon. Thereis competence creep;legislativecreep; and there ispoor quality legislating. The ambition to produce "Better Lawmaking" in the EU and, more generally, "Better Regulation" and latterly "Smarter Regulation" reflects these several 2011] 855 TheLimitsofLegislativeHarmonizationTenYearsafter TobaccoAdvertising concernsthattheEUidentifyitsallocatedtask(s)withmoreprecisionanddischargethem with more care. 88 The stakes are high, for where anxieties mount that local preferences willbediscounted,fearofandalienationfromcentralizationiscorrespondinglygreater. 89 TheEU'slegitimacyisatstake. 90 UndertheTreatyascurrentlystructured,theCourthasandcanhaveonlyalimitedrolein policing these rules. Enhancing respect for the constitutional fundamentals among the political institutions is the real prize, and the Lisbon involvement of the national Parliamentshasatleastsomepotentialforpromotingthat.Thereare,however,reasonsto beskepticalaboutthevirtuesoftheLisbonarrangements.TheLisbonTreatycountsinpart asamissedopportunity.Therearetwounfortunateerrorsinparticular:thedecouplingof Articles352and114andthedecouplingofsubsidiarityandproportionality.
I.TheDecouplingofArticles114and352TFEU
TheLaekenDeclarationofDecember2001,whichsetinmotiontheprocessthatledtothe ConventionontheFutureofEurope,pickedoutexplicitlytwoTreatyprovisionsasripefor review because of their tendency to generate "competence creep." The spotlight was turnedonArticles95and308EC,whicharenowArticles114and352TFEU,andnoother provisions. But only Article 308 EC, which is now Article 352 TFEU, is picked out in the "reasonedopinion"procedureinvolvingnationalParliamentaryoversight.Socontrolofthe Treaty-conferred competence to harmonize pursuant to Article 95 EC, now Article 114 TFEU,remainsfocusedonjudicialcontrol-noextrapoliticaldimensionhasbeeninjected. This is regrettable. The linkage made at Laeken appears to have been broken at the ConventionontheFutureofEuropesimplybecauseofthedistributionofmattersamong
